Are Europe Interest Rates led by FED's Announcements? by Monticini & Vaciago
Are Europe Interest Rates led by FED’s
Announcements?∗
Andrea Monticini† Giacomo Vaciago‡
July 20, 2004
Abstract
This paper investigates the degree and nature of economic and monetary policy
relations among the United States, the euro area, and the British area. Using
daily interest rates, we estimate the impact of monetary policy announcements of a
C e n t r a lB a n ko ni t sd o m e s t i cm a r k e ta n di nw h a tm e a s u r et h e ya r ea b l et oi n ﬂuence
other ﬁnancial markets. In particular, we analyse the eﬀect of the FED’s, ECB’s,
and BoE’s monetary policy announcements on their own market, and in the others.
JEL classiﬁcation: E4, E43, E52, F42
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In a global world – like today, also in the scandals, the ﬁnance has been involved in –
how many central banks are there? The question is not rhetoric because who works on
ﬁnancial markets knows all too well that some Central Banks are more important than
others and therefore their behaviour can be more signiﬁcant.
The hypothesis that we want to verify is very simple: in the last ﬁve years, the
activity of a new central Bank - the ECB for the twelve countries - has not been enough
to establish a correspondent monetary sovereignty. By sovereignty we mean the ability
of a central Bank not only to decide its own interest rate, but also to inﬂuence its yield
curve for all maturities.
In the European Monetary Union, all the preparatory period has been employed to
recover equilibrium in macroeconomic conditions, i.e. the respect of the ﬁve parameters
∗We thank Kenneth Kuttner, and the anonymous referee for useful suggestions.
†Istituto Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Via Necchi 5 - 20123, Milano.
email: andrea.monticini@unicatt.it
‡Istituto Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Via Necchi 5 - 20123, Milano.
email: giacomo.vaciago@unicatt.it
1established in the Maastricht Treaty, which were necessary to give stability to the value
of the new currency. The reduction of the deﬁcit and the debt; the reduction of both
inﬂation rate and interest rates; the exchange rate stability: the respect of these ﬁve
conditions has been necessary to give sovereignty to the new born Central Bank, and its
monetary policy. In our opinion not enough attention has been paid to the necessary
ﬁnancial market integration, on the contrary each country has maintained its respective
Stock Exchange; so the integration of each country and the adoption of the same rules
and procedures for all the ﬁnancial markets has not been realized. A paradoxical result -
also because the liberalization process were not limited to the countries of the Monetary
Union.- was a monetary integration that cannot be distinguished by the globalization
process of ﬁnancial markets.
On the other hand, how market interest rates respond to central Bank actions is a
topic of great interest to ﬁnancial market participants and policymakers alike. Operators
want to know how monetary policy can condition their choice, and the Central Bank is
interested in knowing how its decision on interest rates is transmitted to the market.
In the recent years, many studies1 have concentrated on monetary policy transmission
mechanisms, and they have outlined two main aspects. The ﬁrst one is that Monetary
Authority with its decisions controls well the ﬁrst part of the yield curve, while the
control on the longer expires is lower.
The second characteristic is that the Central Bank uses a transparent monetary policy.
In fact the Monetary Authority tries to give their intention to the market in advance,
with respect to the moment in which decisions will be taken. In this situation, operators
can adequately adjust their decisions. Further, an element which characterizes trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy it is the rational expectation hypothesis. Another
aspect on the connection between monetary policy announcements and money market
response is the use of derivative instruments to extrapolate the expectations of operators.
The aim of this study is to examine how announcements of a Central Bank are re-
ﬂected on its domestic market and in what measure they are able to inﬂuence other
ﬁnancial markets. In particular, we analyse the eﬀects of the FED’s, ECB’s, and BoE’s
monetary policy announcements on their own market, and in the others. In this analysis
we consider the yield curve until 12 month (money market) and over (ﬁnancial mar-
ket).This analysis seeks to verify the particular market’s characteristics on which these
three Central Banks work, and show their connections: is there an ordering and a partic-
ular dependent relationship? Alternatively, are we in a global market where the operators
are continuously looking at every Central Bank? In the past few years, every Central
Bank made investments on reputation and credibility - and eﬀectively, the yield curve
1SeeLange, J., Sack, B., Whitesell, W., 2003.
2is, more than the past few years, under the central Bank’s control. The question is, are
these gains on sovereignty extended to the European Central Bank, or the incomplete
integration on which the ECB works has for instance reduced that eﬀectiveness?
2 Transmission channel
One important issue that has been given little attention in the literature so far is the
relevance of news spillovers across markets. In principle, there are three channels through
which foreign announcements may aﬀect domestic markets. First, foreign news may be
relevant for domestic monetary policy authorities, like when they target “external” vari-
ables, such as the exchange rate. A tightening of monetary policy in the target country,
for instance, may force domestic authorities to adjust their own monetary policy stance
in order to maintain the exchange rate target. In conclusion, foreign announcements
may be important for domestic monetary policy via this direct channel of targeting of
external variables.
The second way is related to the integration of global ﬁnancial markets and arbitrage
arguments. In fact, change in mone t a r yp o l i c yi no n ec o u n t r yw i l la ﬀect other monetary
and ﬁnancial markets via capital ﬂows and the elimination of arbitrage possibilities.
The third way is related to the real variables. In fact, foreign announcements may
reveal important information about domestic macroeconomic conditions. For example,
an economic outlook may give information about the conditions of another monetary
area, and help to predict future moves of monetary policy of that Central Bank. In
literature there are some works on money market’s interdependence, for example Gravelle
and Moessner (2001) ﬁnd that Canadian interest rates are strongly inﬂuenced by US
macroeconomic news but only much less by Canadian ones. They interpret these ﬁndings
as reﬂecting the close integration between Canada and the US, but also revealing some
market uncertainty about the reaction function of Canadian monetary policy; Kim and
Sheen (2000) show similar results for Australian interest rates, which are found to be
strongly aﬀe c t e db yU Sn e w s ,i np a r t i c u l a ra tt h es h o r te n do ft h ey i e l dc u r v e .E h r m a n n
and Fratzscher (2002) analyse the interdependence between the Euro area and the US.
The two authors ﬁnd evidence for a tight interdependence between the Euro and the US
area. In our work that interdependence, as we will show, is labelled dependence because
there is evidence for spillover asymmetric eﬀects caused by the FED’s monetary policy
announcements.
33 A review of earlier studies
The ﬁrst paper to assess markets’ reaction to monetary policy actions is by Cook and
Hahn2 (1989), who examined the one-day response of bond rates to changes in the target
Fed Funds rate from 1974 through to 1979, which was at a time when the Federal Reserve
was targeting the funds rate. Cook and Hahn begin by compiling a record of the changes
in the Federal Reserve’s target over this period. They examine both the records of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (which implemented the changes) and the reports of
the changes in “The Wall Street Journal”. As Cook and Hahn describe it, the actual
Federal funds rate moves closely with the Federal Reserve’s target. Moreover it is highly
improbable that the Federal Reserve is changing the target in response to factors that
would have moved the funds rate in absence of the policy changes, i.e. it is unlikely that
in the absence of the Federal Reserve’s actions the funds rate would move by discrete
amounts. Their procedure was to regress the change in the bill, note, and bond rates
on the change in the Fed’s target funds rate for a sample consisting of 75 days during
which the Fed had changed the funds rate target. They ﬁn dt h a tt h er e s p o n s et ot h e
target rate increases is positive and signiﬁcant at all maturities, but reasonably smaller
at the long end of the yield curve. In addition, Cook and Hahn examine the relationship
between change in interest rates and future changes in the target, but they ﬁnd little
evidence that the target rate changes were anticipated. In contrast with this research,
Roley and Sellon3 (1995), using Cook and Hahn’s eventstudy approach to the 1987-1995
period, ﬁnd a statistically insigniﬁcant bond rates’ response to changes in the target funds
rate. Later on, more sophisticated econometric procedures were used. In particular
some authors, such as Edelberg and Marshall 4(1996), using a Vector Autoregressive
to study monetary policy, ﬁnd a large and signiﬁcant response of bill rates to policy
shocks, and a small response of bond rates. Recently, understanding the importance of
the market’s expectation, some authors have paid attention to derivative instruments.
These instruments can be used to extrapolate the expectation of the operators.
In 2001, using the Federal Funds future to separate changes in funds rate target
between an expected change and a surprising one, Kuttner5, estimated the impact of
monetary policy on bill, note, and bond yields. The author showed that the response
of interest rates to expected changes is insigniﬁcant, while the response to unexpected
change is statistically signiﬁcant and relevant to explain the movements of the inter-
2See Cook, T., Hahn, T., 1989.
3Roley, V.V., Sellon, G.H., 1995.
4Edelberg, W., Marshall, D., 1996.
5Kuttner, K.N., 2001.
4est rates to monetary policy changes. These results conﬁrm the hypothesis of rational
expectations of the economic agents.
In 2002, Perez-Quiros and J. Sicilia 6examine the predictability of the monetary policy
of the ECB and analyse the impact of monetary policy decisions on the yield curve, using
daily data. As regards predictability, they have provided evidence that markets have not
been surprised by monetary policy decisions of the ECB, i.e. markets have been able to
predict the Governing Council’s decisions on key ECB interest rates fairly accurately. As
regards the transmission of the unexpected component of the monetary policy decisions
to the yield curve, they provide evidence that meetings smooth out the impact of the
monetary policy shocks (daily changes in short-term interest rates) which have been
generated outside meeting days.
Ehrmann and Fratzscher7 analyse interdependence between the Euro area and the
US area in the period 1993-20028. . In particular, they examine how the release of
macroeconomic news from the Euro area and US area can inﬂuence domestic interest
rates and interest rates of the other area. The authors ﬁnd some spillover eﬀects from
the USA into the Euro area, specifying that we are in the presence of an increasing
interdependence between these two areas. This interdependence appears very similar to
what we call dependence.
In 2002, looking at the relations between the monetary policy announcements and
the market’s reaction, Ross9 makes a comparative analysis on the market’s ability to
understand the BCE’s, FED’s, and BoE’s decisions. In this work it appears that the
market is able to anticipate correctly the FED’s and the BoE’s decisions. With regards
to the ECB, it seems that the market has diﬃculty in anticipating changes in the interest
rate. The author thinks that it could be explained by the high number of meetings which
can generate confusion.
3.1 Expectations using futures
Measures of monetary policy expectations are an important element of many empiri-
cal papers in macroeconomics and ﬁnance literature. Lately, a strand of literature has
focused on measuring policy expectations from asset prices. In this context, market
interest rates have often been used to parse out the unexpected component of policy
decisions -often referred- as monetary policy shocks. An important issue is the choice of
6Perez-Quiros, G., Sicilia, J., 2002.
7Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., 2002.
8They use data from Bundesbank for the period 1993-1998.
9Ross, K., 2002.
5the correct asset to be used in measuring expectations. In the literature there are a lot
of studies which try to measure federal funds rate expectations. For example, Kuttner
(2001) and Faust, Swanson and Wright (2001) use the current month federal funds fu-
tures contract, Bomﬁn (2002) and Poole and Rasche (2000) use the month-ahead federal
funds futures contract, Cochrane and Piazzessi (2002) use the one-month eurodollar de-
posit rate, Ellingsen and Soderstrom (1999) use the three-month eurodollar futures rate.
In 2002 Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson looked at the optimal market-based measures
of monetary policy expectations for up to ﬁve months. Their predictive power for the
future federal funds rate is higher. In particular, a very simple method able to measure
the unexpected component of monetary policy decisions consists of measuring the diﬀer-
ence of the appropriate futures’ price between the day before the announcements and the
announcement day. Following this line, as described in Kuttner (2001), monetary policy
surprise can be measured by the changes in the “spoth month” future rate calculated
on the day of monetary policy decision. This measure has to agree with the scaling










t is the surprise generated by unexpected changes to the interest rates, f0
s,t is
the spot month future rate the day t of the month s and m is the nember of days in a
month10.
Once we have a surprise generated by monetary policy decision we can measure
market’s expectation in this way:
∆re
t = ∆rt − ∆ru
t . (2)
Where ∆re
t is the expected monetary policy decision while ∆rt is the change in the
interest rate operated by the monetary policy authority. In this work we use a slightly
diﬀerent approach. In fact, we use the futures contract with expiration one month
ahead11. In this way we gain a measure less sensitive to monetary policy decisions,
but more importantly because this contract is the most traded. This approach is quite
similar to Bomﬁn (2001). With this correction from Kuttner (2001) we compute the
unexpected component of monetary policy decisions using (1) without the scaling factor.
The criteria we use to measure expected monetary policy decision remains the same (1).
10 m
m−t it is the scaling factor.
11In particular, see Gürkaynak, R. S., Sack, B., Swanson, E., 2002.
63.2 Measuring announcement’s impact
This section explains the model we have estimated to measure the impact of monetary
policy decisions. Basically we use the model described by Cook and Hahn (1989) with the
improvements of Kuttner (2001). This analysis consists of an OLS regression where the
dependent variable is a one-day response of interest rates, and the independent variable
is the changes in the Fed funds target. Kuttner (2001) uses Cook and Hahn’s model
adjusted to take into account the expectations. In particular, using future contract as
mentioned above, Kuttner, splits the change in target into two components: expected
and unexpected monetary policy decision. We have estimated the following equation:
∆Rt = α + β1∆re
t + β2∆ru
t + εt (3)
w h e r eRi st h ey i e l do ft h er a t ee x a m i n e d ,β i st h er e s p o n s et oe x p e c t e da n du n e x -
pected changes to the target.
Like Kuttner, ∆R is computed as the one-day response to monetary policy decision.
In this way we can outline market’s adjustment after monetary policy decisions. The
coeﬃcient β2 give us the possibility to measure the surprise component. This measure
is very useful to understand if the market believes that it is important news while β1
“expected response” represents the information already known by operators. This econo-
metric exercise permits us to gain indications on the ability of a Central Bank to control
its yield curve, and to analyse the behaviour of non-domestic markets in relation to an-
nouncements of another Central Bank. We expect a value of α very close to zero, a value
of β1 statistically not signiﬁcant and close to zero, and a β2 statistically signiﬁcant and
close to one. These theoretical results are obtained from the rational expectation model
which postulates market response only to new information.
4 The Sample for the money market analysis
The variable ∆Rt represents the yields both short and long term yields, which charac-
terize respectively the European, the American, and the British money markets. The
time series of the interest rates examined are Euribor one month, and one year; USD
LIBOR one month andone year; LIBOR one month and one year. This model examines
interest rates variations between the announcement day and the next day. In this way
we can verify the reaction of the market to the Central Bank’s announcements. The
exogenous variables are represented by the Central Bank’s changes in monetary policy,
which have been measured with variations in the key interest rates (directly controlled
by the central Bank) for their money markets(repo for European and UK market, fed-
eral funds target for US market). To measure market expectations, we use data from
7N. Meeting % N. Meeting % N. Meeting %
Manteined 24 60.00% 80 84.21% 43 71.67%
Change 
0.50% 1 2.50% 2 2.11% 0 0.00%
0.25% 5 12.50% 5 5.26% 5 8.33%
-0.25% 4 10.00% 3 3.16% 10 16.67%
-0.50% 6 15.00% 5 5.26% 2 3.33%




the futures markets. In particular, the futures on euribor with termination one month
and one year, the futures on Federal funds with termination one month and one year,
and the future on GBP with termination three months. The analysis covers the period
between 1st January 1999 and 31st December 2003. During this period we have outlined
the monetary policy meetings of the three central Banks It is important to note how we
consider all the meetings and not only meetings followed by a monetary policy change.
This choice is justiﬁed by the fact that every meeting gives important information that
helps operators to form their expectations, inﬂuencing interest rates’ trend In the period
which has been analysed, the ECB had a greater number of meetings in respect of the
FED and the BoE, as we see from the ﬁg.1. The ECB had 95 meetings, in the same
period the FED had 40, and the BoE 6012.
As we can observe, the younger of the three Banks has had more meetings than
the others. We have to remember that the ECB had two meetings per month. The
European Central Bank during these meetings left its interest rates unchanged in 84.2%
of the meetings, it raised them by half point in 2.1% of the meetings, it raised them by
a quarter of a point (percent) in the 5.3% of the meetings, and it reduced them by a
quarter of a point and by half a point respectively in 5.3% and 3.2% of the meetings.
The Federal Reserve left its interest rates unchanged in 60% of its meetings, it raised
them by half a point and by a quarter of a point respectively in 2.5% and 12.5% of its
meeting, and it reduced them by a quarter of point and by half point respectively 10%
and 15% of its meetings.
The Bank of England in the same period has left its interest rates unchanged in the
71.7% of its meeting, it raised them by a quarter of point in the 8.3% of its meetings,
while it did not raise them by a half of a point and it reduced them by a quarter of a
point and half a point respectively in 16.7% and in 3.3% of its meetings.





Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
Euribor 1 month 0.005 0.069 0.952
t stat 1.311 2.281 13.826
Euribor 12 month 0.009 0.014 0.777
t stat 2.32 0.479 11.051
US LIBOR 1 month -0.002 0.084 0.299
t stat -0.643 3.734 4.552
US LIBOR 12 month 0.004 0.022 0.306
t stat 0.924 0.714 3.356
LIBOR 1 month -0.006 0.031 0.738
t stat -1.55 1.1 7.84
LIBOR 12 month -0.001 0.017 1.023









5T h e r e s u l t s
The results of estimates are reported in the following ﬁgure. The ﬁgure 2 analyses the
response of the European, American, and British money market
The ﬁrst important point to be observed is the general statistical signiﬁcance of
the estimated parameters; it conﬁrms the adequacy of the theoretical model. As we
might expect, intercept and expected response are approximately equal to zero, and
they are statistically insigniﬁcant. On the contrary, analysing unexpected response, we
can observe how the European money market immediately responds to “monetary policy
surprises” announced by the ECB, and its interest rates react to the ECB’s monetary
policy decisions. In particular, we can see how short term interest rates receive almost
entirely the variation happened (the coeﬃcient of unexpected response is close to one),
while the longer money market interest rates (one year) have a slightly
inferior degree of adequacy. With regards to the relations between the ECB’s decisions
and the American money market there seems to be appear any relevant impact on the
US interest rates, because the model has a poorly adjusted R square, and a β2 close to
zero. Finally, we analyse the British money market. This market gives us interesting
results.We can observe, from a statistical point of view, how the model presents a high
adjusted R-square, and a β2 close to one; further more, diﬀerently from what happens in
the European money market, these results are conﬁrmed also for longer money market





Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
Euribor 1 month -0.005 0.012 0.799
t stat -2.132 0.875 6.342
Euribor 12 month -0.003 0.013 0.855
t stat -0.707 0.562 3.933
US LIBOR 1 month -0.002 0.005 1.01
t stat -0.706 0.273 11.849
US LIBOR 12 month -0.006 0.0625 0.752
t stat -0.739 1.676 4.399
LIBOR 1 month -0.003 0.027 0.283
t stat -0.799 1.383 2.417
LIBOR 12 month 0.004 0.04 0.373
t stat 0.701 1.651 2.531
0.125 2.33 3.8
0.371 2.38 12.505
0 . 1 0 42 . 2 73 . 2 7 7
0.41 2.138 14.603
0.785 1.739 72.44
The 1-day response of interest rates to changes in the Fed funds target 
0.653 2.34 37.732
Figure 3:
and the BoE’s meetings are very often on the same days. It is useful to observe that
during the period from 2002 to 2003, in 23 of the ECB’s meetings, 17 have happened
in the same days as those of the BoE, and 11 meetings have been followed by the same
decisions
Now, we consider the Federal Reserve actions. With the aid of ﬁgure 3 we can see the
response to the FED’s announcement in the European, British, and American money
markets.
The model which describes American interest rates’ reaction to the FED’s announce-
ments appears statistically signiﬁcant, with an intercept and an “expected response”
close to zero, an unexpected response close to one and an R-squared also very good.
Also in this case we can conﬁrm that the FED is perfectly able to control its yields
curve, in particular the shortest maturity of the money market. This control, of course,
is stronger with the shorter interest rate of the analysis. Concerning possible spillover
eﬀects from FED to other markets, we conﬁrm that European interest rates react to the
FED announcements; this relation does not appear for the British ones. The result could
show that the European money market takes into account decisions which are taken by
the FED, and is ready to change its yield curve properly only after the FED’s monetary
policy decisions. A greater level of independency seems to caracterize the British money
market.






Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
Euribor 1 month 0.005 0.059 0.943
t stat 0.877 1.545 7.266
Euribor 12 month 0.006 0.007 0.83
t stat 1.398 0.242 7.715
US LIBOR 1 month -0.002 0.067 1.237
t stat -0.718 2.639 5.64
US LIBOR 12 month 0.005 0.016 1.799
t stat 1.196 0.507 6.44
LIBOR 1 month -0.009 0.204 0.976
t stat -1.477 4.531 11.08
LIBOR 12 month 0.003 0.006 1.105







The 1-day response of interest rates to changes in the repo rate 
Figure 4:
Also in this case, as in previuos ones, it is conﬁrmed by tests the signiﬁcance of the
estimated model. The Bank of England seems able to control its yield curve at least until
the maturity of one year. The main characteristic is that, diﬀerently from other Central
Banks, the inﬂuence of the BoE’s decisions is stronger on the LIBOR 1 year than on the
LIBOR 1 month. Of course, it is possible to justify this situation by remembering that
the BoE does not use a speciﬁc target for the shorter interest rates, preferring to pay
attention to the longer one. Another time, European interest rates appear sensitive to the
BoE’s monetary policy decisions. In fact, the Euribor one month and one year interest
rates show a ready response to the unexpected monetary policy change. It is necessary
to consider that a possible reason for these movements can be due to coincidence of BoE
and ECB’s. meetings Diﬀerently from what we outlined about the ECB, the American
money market seems to consider the decisions taken by the BoE. Interest rates with a
termination of one month and one year show an overreaction to the BoE’s monetary
policy decisions. This behaviour could be justiﬁed by the fact that American money
market considers the BoE’s decisions like a proxy for the future FED’s decisions. It is
natural in fact that , given its secular reputation, the BoE is thought of as a precursor
of particular general interest for its monetary policy decisions.
116 The Interest Rates Response on the Bond Market
From the previous analysis, it appears that all three money markets (European, British,
and US) respond to their Central Bank. The response of the interest rates is almost 100%
(the β2 is close to one) for the UK and the US, while for the ECB it is stronger only
in the short-term interest rates, especially if we use a comparative analysis with the two
other ones. Following this indication, we look at the reactions of the ﬁnancial markets, or
Bond markets. This analysis has been made by looking at the reactions of the European,
British and American markets to the FED’s, the ECB’s, and the BoE’s monetary policy
announcements. In this comparative analysis we decide not to include the American
bond market. In fact, how it is possible to see from the previous analysis, and as it
has been clearly shown by a number of papers, the American Bond market responds to
the Fed even thought the impact of the ECB’s announcements is not relevant. Further
more, from a ﬁrst overview, response of the American Bond’s interest rates are aﬀected
by some apparent inconsistencies. It is possible to observe the presence of some outliers
that can inﬂuence the econometric exercise13.
Paying attention to the results of the estimates (ﬁgure 5), we can conﬁrm the poor
ability of the ECB to inﬂuence its yield curve. In fact, also with the two years interest
rates, the market makes an adjustment of 65% to the surprise which has been generated
by a monetary policy announcement. This unexpected response, with the 7 years interest
rates, rapidly becomes less signiﬁcant with the increasing of the time-expiration. The
interest rates on the British market paradoxically seem to be very sensitive to the ECB’s
announcements. Really, as we mentioned before, the ECB and the BoE had a lot of
meetings in the same days.
Examining the reactions to the BoE’s monetary policy decisions, it is possible to
conﬁrm the ability of the BoE to control its term structure of interest rates. In fact, we
also observe a response in the 30 years interest rate. Finally ﬁgure 7 permits us to tell
something about the FED’s role. In particular, as we hypothesized, it seems that the
European Market is driven by the FED’s monetary policy. In fact, looking at the two
years, 3 years, ﬁve years, and seven years interest rates, we observes a quite near to 100%
adjustment of European Interest rates to the FED’s announcements. This inﬂuence is
present, but it is lower, on the British market.
13The FED’s meeting on 3rd Jannuary 2001 representsa a big outlier due to late-day activity on bond
market.
127C o n c l u s i o n
The debate on the ECB’s monetary policy was concentrated on two main aspects: cred-
ibility and reputation14.
For the ﬁrst one, the judgement is positive, in fact the ECB has been able to control
both the expected and the actual inﬂation’s rate: monetary stability was never considered
hard to obtain. Close to this positive aspect, it is possible to outline others which present
more problems. For example concerning “reputation” of the new born Central Bank.
The reputation has been modelled on the Bundesbank15, and this fact can help us to
understand the limited actions of the ECB16.
The independence from political power which is established with an international
law; the already realised macroeconomic convergence; success which has been obtained
in reaching targets of monetary stability, are not indicators of a sovergnity which has
been already achieved in determining the main monetary variables17.
The common opinion that, in a global economy, the European ﬁnancial markets
follow the behaviour of the dominant market18, can signify “a poor quality” of Monetary
Union. That is the interpretation we give to our results on the announcement’s eﬀects
respectively by the ECB and the FED.
On the contrary the good quality of the American ﬁnancial market, which is strictly
connected with the great ﬁnancial centre of New York is better than what the European
ﬁnancial market has been able to obtain. In fact, in spite of the oﬃcial ﬁnancial centre
of Frankfurt, there is an eﬀective (paradoxically oﬀshore) capital in London, with a lot
of other national ﬁnancial market. We hope that this situation can become better with
London’s entrance in the Euro and therefore the common currency, to complete the
ECB’s sovergnity.
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Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
 2 year 0.007 -0.016 0.653
t stat 1.105 -0.329 5.733
3 year 0.009 -0.036 0.543
t stat 1.31 -0.693 4.581
 5 year 0.002 -0.07 0.434
t stat 0.435 -1.399 3.800
7 year -0.009 -0.035 0.212
t stat -1.628 -0.776 2.059
 10 year -0.001 -0.075 0.205
t stat -0.267 -1.828 2.201
15 year 0.002 -0.098 0.207
t stat 0.364 -2.323 2.144
20 year -0.013 -0.021 0.018
t stat -2.404 -0.517 0.194
30 year -0.012 -0.071 0.054
t stat -2.251 -1.781 0.590






Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
 2 year 0 0.004 0.895
t stat 0.016 0.170 9.751
3 year 0.0076 0.009 0.754
t stat 1.450 0.285 6.674
 5 year 0.006 0.012 0.654
t stat 1.385 0.382 6.253
7 year 0.008 0.019 0.56
t stat 1.571 0.591 5.067
 10 year 0.008 0.011 0.431
t stat 1.455 0.326 3.592
15 year 0.005 0.001 0.346
t stat 1.034 0.034 3.111
20 year 0.004 0.004 0.288
t stat 0.830 0.130 2.667
30 year 0.002 0.003 0.234

























Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
 2 year 0.008 -0.012 0.668
t stat 1.073 -0.248 3.800
3 year 0.008 -0.040 0.514
t stat 1.086 -0.855 3.155
 5 year 0.003 -0.061 0.442
t stat 0.399 -1.245 2.615
7 year 0.003 -0.065 0.393
t stat 0.714 -1.065 1.879
 10 year -0.001 -0.054 0.209
t stat -0.177 -1.191 1.333
15 year 0.002 0.014 0.451
t stat 0.365 0.307 2.814
20 year -0.0009 -0.081 -0.043
t stat -0.135 -1.752 -0.271
30 year -0.007 -0.113 0.102
t stat -1.11 -2.480 0.651






Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
 2 year -0.0002 -0.04 0.705
t stat -0.048 -0.994 8.920
3 year 0.006 -0.066 0.574
t stat 0.865 -1.332 5.898
 5 year 0.004 -0.101 0.436
t stat 0.745 -2.264 4.992
7 year 0.004 -0.117 0.304
t stat 0.732 -2.522 3.351
 10 year 0.006 -0.126 0.2
t stat 0.887 -2.470 2.000
15 year 0.006 -0.105 0.163
t stat 0.897 -2.140 1.690
20 year 0.005 -0.103 0.145
t stat 0.843 -2.129 1.534
30 year 0.005 -0.104 0.13
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Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
 2 year -0.003 0.01 1.034
t stat -0.463 0.277 3.15
3 year -0.004 -0.006 1.021
t stat -0.667 -0.182 3.139
 5 year -0.0002 -0.007 0.856
t stat -0.03 -0.188 2.293
7 year 0.007 0.02 0.977
t stat 0.966 0.469 2.577
 10 year -0.001 0.013 0.521
t stat -0.24 0.353 1.564
15 year 0.009 -0.024 0.267
t stat 1.367 -0.68 0.84
20 year 0.006 0.038 0.121
t stat 0.724 0.773 0.28
30 year -0.0002 0.012 0.299
t stat -0.04 0.426 1.15






Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
 2 year 0.012 0.044 0.902
t stat 1.537 1.327 4.490
3 year 0.014 0.055 0.766
t stat 1.498 1.453 3.314
 5 year 0.011 0.058 0.600
t stat 1.143 1.442 2.465
7 year 0.013 0.072 0.296
t stat 1.306 1.717 1.172
 10 year 0.014 0.082 0.143
t stat 1.299 1.899 0.547
15 year 0.012 0.074 0.096
t stat 1.165 1.737 0.377
20 year 0.011 0.069 0.048
t stat 1.083 1.626 0.188
30 year 0.01 0.062 0.072














The 1-day response of interest rates to changes in the Fed funds target 
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